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Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1947. No. 739 - 740

ANTHONY T. AUGELLI, Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy of JOHN NIZOLEK FURNITURE
CO., INC., Bankrupt,

Petitioner,

vs.

O. F. C. CORPORATION,

Respondent,

and

ANTHONY T. AUGELLI, Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy of NIZOLEK FURNITURE &
CARPET CO., INC., Bankrupt,

Petitioner,

vs.

O. F. C. CORPORATION,

Respondent.

**BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI.**

NATHAN BILDER,


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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

I.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is defective in failing to contain several jurisdictional requisites. Thus it fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 38 of the Rules of this Court since it is not accompanied by a statement particularly disclosing the basis upon which it is contended that this Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment or

decree in question (a jurisdictional statement such as is described in Rule 12 of the Rules of this Court). There is no reference

- (a) to the statutory provision believed to sustain the jurisdiction of this Court, or
- (b) to the Statute of the State or of the United States, the validity of which is involved, or
- (c) to the date upon which the petition for certiorari was presented.

There is no statement showing that the nature of the case and the rulings of the Court are such as to bring the case within the jurisdictional provisions relied on and citing the cases believed to sustain the jurisdiction.

The petition further fails to comply with Rule 38 of the Rules of this Court in that it does not contain any reasons relied on for the allowance of the writ. Thus, it is not shown by the petition that the holding of the Court below is in conflict with any applicable decision of another Circuit Court of Appeals or of this Court, (although reference to such a conflict is made in the brief in support of the petition), nor is it shown that there are any other reasons for the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court such as are set forth in Rule 38, Paragraph 5 (b) of the Rules of this Court.

Since the petition for a writ of certiorari is defective in the jurisdictional requisites stated above, and in failing to contain the requirements prescribed by Rule 38 of the Rules of this Court, the petition should be denied.

II.

The petitioner has presented (on p. 2 of his petition) a question which is based upon a set of facts that do not exist in this case. In his statement of the question, petitioner assumes that the exercise by the bankrupt of dominion over the proceeds of collections, and the use of those proceeds in its general business, was all done with the knowledge, permission and acquiescence of the respondent, O. F. C. Corporation. This is directly contrary to the undisputed evidence in the record. The District Judge, in his opinion, unequivocally found as follows (71 F. Supp. 1012 at 1015):

"The argument advanced by the trustee in bankruptcy is obviously founded upon the assumption that the bankrupts reserved complete dominion over the accounts receivable, inconsistent with their effective sale and transfer to the Corporation. This assumption is not supported by the evidence; in fact, the evidence is to the contrary. The only privilege reserved to the Bankrupts under the 'collection agreements' was that of collecting the accounts receivable as 'agent of and in trust for the' Corporation. The reservation of this privilege, an advantage to the Bankrupts and a convenience to the Corporation, did not invalidate the assignments. *Benedict v. Ratner, supra*; *Clark v. Iselin*, 21 Wall. 360; *General Commercial Acceptance Co. v. Lancee*, 113 F. 2d 300; *In re Prudence Co.*, 88 F. 2d 420; *Parker v. Meyer*, 37 F. 2d 556; *Chapman v. Emerson*, 8 F. 2d 353. The use of the proceeds by the Bankrupts, an admitted fact stressed by the trustee in bankruptcy, was clearly in violation of the express provisions of the said agreements. It appears from the undisputed testimony that this use of the proceeds was a mis-

appropriation of funds which the officers of the Bankrupts successfully concealed from the auditors of the Corporation until January of 1942."

As may be seen from these findings of the District Judge, this is not a case in which the respondent knowingly permitted or acquiesced in the admittedly improper conduct of the bankrupts. The question presented by the petitioner, therefore, has no relation to the facts of this case, and the petition should therefore be denied.

III.

Petitioner complains (at p. 3 of the petition) that the District Judge in his findings failed utterly to give effect to the undisputed evidence as to the conduct of the parties. This is hardly a ground for granting a petition to this Court for a writ of certiorari. In any event, however, the findings of the District Judge are amply supported by the record. See, for example, the following testimony of Adam Nizolek, an officer of the bankrupt companies, which discloses that any moneys withheld by the bankrupts from the O. F. C. Corporation were carefully concealed in secret drawers and records, in order to prevent the O. F. C. Corporation from discovering the existence of violations:

"Q. So that the only records or ledger sheets of accounts which were sold to the O. F. C. by your Newark company was contained in this binder? A. Only ledger sheets—but we had other records.

Q. Ledger sheets. A. We had other records.

Q. What other records? A. We had a list of the accounts.

Q. Where? A. We had that in our drawer.

Q. In your drawer? A. Yes.

Q. On loose sheets? A. On a regular pad.

Q. On a pad? A. Yes.

Q. You kept in a drawer in your personal desk—
A. Not the personal desk—in our desk—the office
desk.

Q. A list of the accounts which were sold to the
O. F. C., is that right? A. Not all the accounts, only
the accounts where moneys had been withheld.

Q. Where moneys were withheld? A. Yes.

Q. And that you kept in a drawer in your own
desk? A. That's right, sir.

Q. And you always kept that list up to date to
show what moneys belonged to the O. F. C. had been
withheld and had not been remitted on? A. That's
right.

Q. And that is how you were able to tell how
much of their money you had been using? A. That's
right.

Q. Is that the only place where you kept a rec-
ord of these withheld accounts? A. Yes.

Q. The O. F. C. ledger sheets did not show it, did
it—did they? A. No.

Q. Why not? A. For the simple reason if their
auditor would come around, they would immediately
determine how much money was withheld, and if we
were not in a position to pay it, we realize what
would happen.

Q. You did not want them to know about it? A.
Of course not—of course not.

Q. So that so far as the ledger sheets were con-
cerned, they contained no record whatever of moneys
withheld? A. That's right.

Q. When Mr. Siemers came around to the place
of business in Newark to find out—to check up on
the delinquent accounts, he examined the ledger
sheets, didn't he? A. That's right, sir.

Q. These ledger sheets that were contained in the book marked 'Property of O. F. C.'? A. That's right.

Q. Is that right? A. Yes.

Q. And it was against those ledger sheets that he checked the delinquencies, didn't he? A. That's right, sir.

Q. And of course he did not have access to these sheets in your drawer, did he? A. No, sir." (pp. 16 and 17, transcript of hearing held before Referee Oct. 8, 1943.)

An examination of this testimony can leave no doubt that the O. F. C. Corporation was unaware of any violations being committed by the bankrupts in the remittance of moneys collected under the instruments which had been sold and transferred.

IV.

The petitioner complains that the judgment he attacks is in conflict with the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in *Irving Trust Company v. Finance Service Company*, 63 Fed. (2d) 694 (1933). The distinction between the two cases is patent and again involves the petitioner's insistence on assuming facts contrary to those which appear in the record.

The decision of the Second Circuit in the *Irving Trust* case was based entirely upon the finding that the lender knowingly permitted and acquiesced in the free use by the bankrupts of all collections made. Thus, the opinion of the Court sets forth (63 Fed. (2d) 694 at 696):

"The defendant and the bankrupt both understood that the collections should be at the latter's free disposal. Not only is this shown by the fact that the bankrupt made no effort to segregate them, as the defendant knew, but the defendant expressly told it that its business would not be interfered with as long as it kept up its payments on the notes."

These facts do not exist in the present case. The testimony and the findings of the courts below are directly to the contrary. *The Irving Trust* case is therefore wholly inapplicable here.

Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully submit that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

NATHAN BILDER,
Counsel for Respondent.